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A Conspiracy of Silence? 
The Popular Press and the Strategic 
BoiDbing CaiDpaign in Europe 
Laurie Peloquin 
T he controversy surrounding the decision by Bomber Command to target German 
cities populated mainly with non-combatants 
rages even today. It has been said that these 
were decisions made in secret, so secret that 
not even the airmen who flew the missions 
knew what they were really striking. In his 
book Weapons and Hope, physicist Freeman 
Dyson states, "I was one of the very few people 
who knew what were the objectives of the 
campaign, how miserably we were failing to 
meet these objectives, and how expensive 
this was for us in money and lives," and, "I felt 
deeply my responsibility, being in possession 
of all this information which was so carefully 
concealed." 1 His assertions formed the basis 
for material presented in the CBC production 
of The Valour and the Horror episode entitled 
"Death by Moonlight: Bomber Command," 
which claimed: 
British High Command knew how few bomber crews 
would survive and deliberately hid the truth. That's 
not all that was concealed. The crews and the 
public were told that the bombing targets were 
German factories and military installations. In fact 
in 1942 a secret plan was adopted. Germany would 
be crushed through the deliberate annihilation of 
its civilians. 2 
An examination of the popular press available 
in Canada during the height of the bombing 
campaign against German cities, July 1943-
April 1944, strongly contradicts these 
Opposite: These headlines appeared in Canadian 
newspapers in 1943-1944, many of them as the lead 
to front page stories. 
assertions. Reports appeared in the daily 
newspapers and weekly newsmagazines which 
outlined both the physical destruction and 
the civilian losses of the designated cities. 
The press provided their own analysis of the 
significance of objectives, results achieved 
against both production plants and morale, 
and RAF /RCAF losses which were being 
incurred. Technological advances which 
improved Bomber Command's ability to batter 
the enemy were explained to the lay reader. 
Newspapers graphically detailed the 
hardships suffered by the inhabitants of the 
stricken cities, and offered justification to the 
Canadian people explaining why war was 
being waged against non-combatants. The 
information on the bombing campaign was 
available to any who chose to read about it. 
* * * * * 
In July 1943 a fierce new bombing 
offensive began, designating one city, 
Hamburg, for "total destruction. "3 The 
intention was twofold: to reduce the industrial 
capacity to produce war materiel, and to 
adversely affect the morale of the civilian 
population. 4 "The Battle of Hamburg" 
consisted of four heavy raids against the city 
over the period of July 24-August 2, 1943. As 
well as being the second largest city in 
Germany, Hamburg was the centre of German 
U-boat production and contained some 
aircraft-industry plants. The raids resulted 
in massive destruction throughout the city, 
over 40,000 people dead and more than a 
million displaced. Throughout summer and 
autumn the RAF made several attacks against 
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The Avro Lancaster (top) and the Handley Page 
Halifax (above)formed the backbone of the RAF Bomber 
Command during the Second World War. 
NAC PA 145613 & 133490 
a variety of cities, including Berlin. In 
November, the Battle of Berlin was launched 
in earnest. It continued until the end of 
March, when preparations for the D-Day 
landings began. The results against Berlin 
were not as devastating as in Hamburg, but 
Bomber Command succeeded in causing 
extensive damage, thousands of deaths and 
rendered many more thousands homeless. 
24 
The newspaper reports were blatant about 
the intention of the attacks. "The air battle 
designed apparently to flatten Germany's 
greatest port began Saturday night" stated 
an article in the Toronto Star. 5 The Christian 
Science Monitor referred to, "this attempt to 
efface Hamburg from the military map. "6 The 
Globe and Mail described the battle as, "a 
sustained effort to wipe Germany's second 
city off the map and blot out its great 
submarine works. "7 The attempted assault 
upon morale was not overlooked by the press 
either. It was pointed out that Hamburg had 
been the site of the first unrest in Germany 
leading to the armistice in 1918.8 These same 
articles went on to depict demonstrations in 
Hamburg after the air raids calling for the end 
to the war. 9 An American newsmagazine 
reported, "the suffering is so tremendous 
that many people have been plunged into 
apathy. "10 The newspaper reports conveyed 
the belief that the annihilation of Hamburg 
was necessary in a military sense by their 
references to "Germany's greatest port" and 
its "great submarine works." They also 
suggested that the war might be brought to a 
swift end by the disillusioned German 
populace forced to face the miseries brought 
on by the bombing campaign. 
After the raids, the press reported on the 
conditions in Hamburg and the perceived 
results achieved by Bomber Command. 
Headlines proclaimed, "Hamburg blitzed to 
chaos-lives from hand to mouth" 11 and 
"Hamburg Ceases to Exist. "12 Several reports 
spoke of damage to submarines and the 
dockyards in general. 13 Some papers mention 
destruction of specific industrial premises, 
such as the Deutsche Werft and the Blohm & 
Voss submarine yards. 14 These accounts are 
confirmed in the post-raid records 15 , although 
another popular report regarding the collapse 
of a tunnel under the Elbe river proved to be 
false. 16 The successes of Bomber Command 
against German industry were quickly 
disseminated to the public. 
Wreckage caused to strategic targets were 
not the only stories to be found in the 
newspapers. Accounts of the death toll ranged 
and scenes of violence were related in great 
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detail. "When the giant demolition bombs 
fell, they blew away blocks of houses, making 
rubble of entire districts and blasting bodies 
out into the streets, even into the trees of 
Hamburg's parks." 17 A similar description 
appeared in Time, "In the ruins, on the streets, 
in the branches of trees where bombs had 
blown them, lay the dead, their eyes wide 
open, staring. "18 Eyewitnesses reported, "the 
bus which took them out of town wound 
through heaps of debris and bodies. "19 
Although the term "firestorm" was not yet 
used, the fact that a great conflagration 
developed in Hamburg as a result of Allied 
bombing was duly reported. 20 According to a 
German radio broadcast reported in a 
Canadian newspaper, "heavy terror attacks 
caused extensive fires in several areas. "21 
Descriptions came back from RCAF pilots, 
who pictured these scenes, "Hamburg was so 
bright with fires, it looked like a prairie 
sunset," and "Hamburg was blazing like a 
paper box. "22 The drama and horror of 
Hamburg's predicament was summed up by 
the reporter in Time who said, "Dante's Inferno 
was incomparable with Hamburg. Entire city 
districts were wiped out. "23 It was clear by the 
newspaper reports that much more damage 
was being wreaked in Hamburg besides that 
caused to military targets. 
The Battle of Hamburg ended with a final 
assault on the night of August 2, 1943. 
Bomber Command's sites then fixed on Berlin, 
with the main attack set to begin in November. 
After the destruction caused in Hamburg the 
press also turned its attention towards 
Germany's capital city. The Battle of Hamburg 
was seen to have initiated a large scale 
evacuation of the population of Berlin, fearing 
that they would be the next targets. According 
to Newsweek, "so sharp was the impact of the 
bombings on the Germans that steps were 
taken to begin the evacuation of Berlin."24 
This was explained by another publication as 
being the result of refugees from Hamburg 
fleeing to Berlin, "where their tale spread 
terror among the people of the capital. "25 The 
press regarded blows to the morale of the 
people of Berlin as quite significant. According 
to one source, "On the morale front it ranks 
ahead of all other German cities. When the 
others were raided the outcry of the Germans 
was bitter but local. When Berlin was hit 
groans rose from all over Germany."26 That 
Berlin was to be the next major target for the 
bombing campaign was neither unknown nor 
concealed. The Kitchener Daily Record noted, 
"that lengthening nights will bring Berlin 
itself into the range of heavy day-and-night 
bombings by October or November."27 The 
approaching offensive generated optimism in 
some spheres, with comments such as, "The 
Hamburg assault probably presented the 
broad pattern of what should really be 
regarded as the Battle of Berlin, and should 
be one of the great, decisive battles of the 
war."28 The New York Times was even more 
enthusiastic, stating that, "The coming 
attempt to make the German capital 
uninhabitable is part of the plan to which the 
Allies are definitely committed, namely, to 
bring the Axis to the point of submission by 
air attack alone. "29 The approaching offensive 
against Berlin was both publicised and 
anxiously awaited by the popular press. 
TRANSITION 
Kitchener Daily Record, August 3, 1943. 
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The descriptions of the Berlin raids, which 
began in August with the official "Battle" 
commencing in November, were similar to 
those of Hamburg, but also included a sense 
of excitement at finally being able to hit the 
Reich capital. Headlines read, "R.A.F. 
'Hamburgs' Berlin with 2,000 Tons of 
Bombs"30 , "Hundreds of Bombers Spread Ruin 
in Berlin in Thunderbolt Smash"31 and "Nazis 
Helpless, Make Them Hopeless by Air Attack, 
U.S. General Urges."32 Maps of the centre of 
the city were reproduced illustrating all areas 
which received damage, with special focus on 
government buildings. 33 In December, 
Newsweek declared, "RAF's Fiery Battle of 
Berlin Tops Assaults on Three Fronts" and 
echoed the words of Air Marshal Sir Arthur 
Harris by describing that Berliners "may have 
sensed that they were about to reap the 
whirlwind for what the Luftwaffe had done to 
so many other cities."34 Again, the Bomber 
Command objectives were explicitly defined 
in the press. "The morale of Berliners and 
Germans was as much the R.A.F.'s target as 
the sprawling factories, Government offices 
and railway communications of their 
capital. "35 The same article quotes Arthur 
Harris as being prepared to continue the 
Battle of Berlin, "as opportunity serves and 
circumstances dictate until the heart of Nazi 
Germany ceases to beat." On the same 
subject, Saturday Night describes Harris as, 
"Listen, Joel If This Ain't a Secon'd Frbnt, What Is It?" 
Kitchener Daily Record, August 28, 1943. 
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"a realist in the best sense as the Germans 
are beginning to understand. He will continue 
to bomb them until they understand it 
completely. "36 Press coverage of the Battle of 
Berlin was straightforward and detailed, and 
often included descriptions and numbers of 
dead civilians. As with the Battle of Hamburg, 
nothing was held back from their audience. 
Details of Allied casualties were also 
readily available in the newspapers, with 
losses often being displayed in the headlines. 
From the opening volley of the Battle of 
Hamburg the press circulated accurate 
statistics on the numbers of planes lost in 
raids against GermanyY A few newspapers 
actually make reference to Air Ministry 
communiques38 , which must have been issued 
on a regular basis to account for the 
comprehensive figures provided in almost 
every newspaper. The Canadian press always 
included the numbers of RCAF planes shot 
down as well as the total lost. They also 
publicized the average number of crew on 
each bomber, 39 leaving no doubt that lost 
airplanes meant lost lives. 
Newsweek introduced its readership to 
bombing techniques as well as navigational 
and meteorological innovations. Weather 
reconnaissance units were formed in April 
1943 to provide accurate, current data to 
assist in planning bombing missions. 40 
Newsweek heaped praise on the RAF's "met 
men" who, "have now acquired the skill that 
permitted the RAF to stage a raid on Berlin 
despite weather that could have spelled death 
to the bombers."41 The release of this 'secret' 
innovation served to reassure North American 
readers that everything possible was being 
done to keep the aircrews safe. More 
encouragement was provided by the 
explanation of the Pathfinders. Newsweek 
told how these specially equipped airplanes 
preceded the main force, located the target 
and marked it with coloured flares. They 
furnished specific descriptions of the sky 
marking techniques. 42 They also published 
accurate details about H2S, the navigational 
aid which enabled the Pathfinders to locate 
the target. 43 Not even the mechanics involved 
in finding a target and bombing it were 
concealed from the public. 
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The newspapers defended the bomber 
campaign by demonstrating how it was 
benefitting the war effort. "Bombing Pays Off 
With 'Invisible Dividends"'44 read the headline 
in Saturday Night in December 1943. It was 
referring to the damage caused to German 
industrial production. This was a common 
theme, often repeated. "The damage done-
if it is great enough-justifies the loss of 
planes"45 was one way of explaining the loss 
rates which were being reported. Estimates 
of lost production appeared regularly, such 
as, "If Hamburg's industries now are 
completely wrecked, Germany's U -boat 
production would be forced down by 
approximately one third"46 , "an RAF rule of 
thumb: one raid of 2,000 tons requires a 
month's organization work by 18,500 men, 
destroys as much as 75,000 Nazi's can 
produce in a month"47 and, "this destruction 
has broken off 20% of Germany's industrial 
strength, with the deadline of that capacity 
rated at 35%. The safety margin, therefore, is 
narrowing with deadly precision. "48 The 
meaning of these statements might be rather 
obscure but it was obvious that the bombing 
of German cities was having some effect on 
their industrial capacity. The press justified 
the bombing of civilians by describing 
decreases in the ability of the populace to 
produce war materiel. "The air offensive 
against Hamburg had shaken the 
psychological resistance inside Germany 
deeply, affecting the working capacity of the 
entire population. "49 According to Saturday 
Night, "workers cannot produce if they are 
denied the bare necessities oflife. "50 Bomber 
Command, as reported in the newspapers, 
was causing significant damage to German 
war industry, whether by hindering the 
capacity of their factories or by retarding the 
ability of their workers. 
The press also regarded the bomber 
offensive as a means of retribution against 
Germany for its previous incursions against 
Britain. Time presents this analysis, "German 
propagandists had once spoken gloatingly of 
the destruction which their Luftwaffe visited 
on British cities; they could find no words 
now to quell the rising terror of their people 
under the Allied bombs. "51 Comparisons of 
the destruction in German cities to the "blitz" 
in London were also made. One description 
of the state of Berlin after a raid begins, "the 
human scene was much like London's. "52 
Another account pictures a bomb scene in 
great detail, then reveals that they are talking 
about wreckage in London before they go on 
to tell about Berlin. 53 Comparison to another 
famous scene of destruction appears in some 
reports. Newsweek said, "Hamburg ... became 
a study in destruction that compared with 
Stalingrad. "54 This analogy also applied to 
Berlin, an area of which was, "transformed 
into a miniature Stalingrad of destruction. "55 
Germany was portrayed as deserving the hits 
it was taking, if only to equalize the existing 
status quo. 
·Bomber Command's own intention of 
harming the morale of the German people 
was also picked up by the press and presented 
to the public as a positive byproduct of 
attacking cities. Some exaggerated reports 
appeared, such as, "their spirit broken by 
constant Allied aerial assaults, thousands of 
Germans are committing suicide rather than 
face an uncertain future,"56 although most 
were more realistic, describing "the gradual 
wearing down which continual air 
bombardment produces on the individual's 
ability to stand up against it. "57 One report 
contended that, "the greatest and perhaps 
most decisive result of the Allied air offensive 
may be the destruction of German morale. "58 
As the RAF carried out its objective of bombing 
cities, it became apparent that housing in 
Germany would become a growing problem. 
"A No. 1 topic in the Reich as a result of the 
raids is housing, "59 read one report. A headline 
in Saturday Night proclaimed, "A Housing 
Shortage Helps Nail the Nazi Coffin," with the 
article relating how, "the psychological effect 
of overcrowding and bad housing is 
considerable. "60 The press appreciated the 
efforts made to injure civilian morale in 
Germany and passed the information along 
to the public. 
Hopes were high among the journalists 
that the bombing campaign would bring a 
quick end to the war. They spoke of the air 
war as, "designed to bring Germany to her 
knees, "61 and, referring to the upcoming winter 
offensive, "this may possibly turn out to be 
27 
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the blow that collapses the Reich. "62 Air 
Marshal Arthur Harris is cited as an expert 
observer of the proceedings. He believed 
that, "Germany can be rendered helpless to 
carry on the war within four or five months, "63 
given the proper equipment. General "Hap" 
Arnold, Chief of the U.S. Army Air Forces was 
equally as optimistic, predicting that, "Allied 
air blows will knock out Germany or leave the 
Nazis too groggy to resist invasion. "64 The 
Toronto Daily Star cites unnamed sources as 
suggesting, "that the Berlin offensive might 
be timed to precede an ultimatum to Germany 
from Prime Minister Churchill, President 
Roosevelt and Premier Stalin to surrender 
unconditionally or face even greater 
destruction. "65 The air offensive and any 
civilian casualties it caused could be easily 
justified if it succeeded in defeating Germany. 
As early as July 1943 speculation emerged 
in the press that the bombing of German 
cities was really just preparation for an actual 
land invasion. The Combined Chiefs of Staff 
had approved this objective of the air war on 
May 14, 1943. 66 Christian Science Monitor 
proposed, "It is barely possible it may be the 
prelude to an important Allied amphibious 
operation in Northern Europe."67 Under the 
headline "The Sights Are Lowered" in 
September 1943, is an article which describes 
the disappointment of the airmen when they 
realize, "instead of fighting for victory from 
the air, they were fighting toward further 
victory by the ground armies. "68 By November 
even the timing of the land offensive was 
being publicized, "For by spring the Allied 
invasion of Europe will almost certainly be 
under way. "69 The use of the words "almost 
certainly" implies that the press was merely 
speculating on the possibility, and not that 
they had received any official dispatch on the 
subject. Nevertheless, as time went on the 
language became more confident, as 
Newsweek asserted, "the winter offensive, 
prelude to invasion, was on. "70 As the air war 
failed to bring about the fall of Germany, 
those at home could take comfort in reading 
that it was preparing the way for a final, 
decisive battle on land. 
Perhaps one ofthe most important aspects 
of the bombing campaign was its role as a 
28 
second front at a time when the Allies could 
not afford an assault on Germany by land. It 
forced the Germans to divert substantial 
amounts of equipment and manpower away 
from the main battle with Russia. This facet 
of the air war was known and revealed to the 
North American readership in an overt 
manner: 
On the western air front the Germans have 
concentrated 50 to 60% of their total strength in 
fighter planes. They have stripped the Russian 
front to a thin cover of fighters, almost denuded the 
Mediterranean front. All their new fighter production 
is being sent to the west, and with it their best 
pilots. 71 
In an article on Arthur Harris entitled "The 
Germans Hate This Man," he is praised for 
having, "forced (the Germans) to divert 
hundreds of guns and night fighters from 
other operations."72 Claims appeared in print 
that, "90% of (Germany's) pilot recruits have 
been switched from bombers to fighters ... the 
Allied air war against western Germany has 
forced the Nazis to tie up at least 2,000,000 
men for air defence ... the Nazis have 
concentrated 75% of their air force fighter 
strength in the west of Europe, draining the 
Russian and Italian fronts to the minimum. "73 
Time maintained that, "the second front that 
the Russians demanded actually came into 
being between September 1942 and 
September 1943. This was the air offensive 
against Europe. "74 Justification of the 
bombing of German cities was easily supplied 
by the assistance it gave by diverting German 
forces from other fronts and by finally bringing 
the war back to Germany. As one journalist 
wrote, "Some Germans, at least, had learned 
a most shocking lesson: that Germany can 
no longer wage war exclusively on non-
German territory. "75 
The intent of the Combined Bomber 
Offensive in 1943 was contained in an official 
document known as the Pointblank Directive. 
If any part of the bomber campaign was to 
have been kept secret, it would have been a 
formal order such as this. As the directive 
stated, the mission was to: 
conduct a joint United States-British air offensive 
to accomplish the progressive destruction and 
dislocation of the German military, industrial and 
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economic system, and the undermining of the morale 
of the German people to a point where their capacity 
for armed resistance is fatally weakened. 76 
This information, which, due to its sensitive 
nature, would have been expected to remain 
within government and military circles only, 
became available to the public in September 
1943. Although not printed in all the popular 
newspapers and newsmagazines, the 
American publication Newsweek presented a 
paraphrased account of the objectives. The 
following aims appeared, written by Peter 
Masefield, a British aviation writer: 
1) To destroy Germany's industry in the factories, 
2) To disrupt the supplies and communications 
which are the life blood of production. 
3) To destroy the physical capacity of the workers 
to carry on the war by smashing their homes 
and their means of livelihood. 
4) To lower and, in the end, break the morale of 
the German people in the home front. 77 
The similarity to the original Pointblank 
Directive is indisputable. Whether the goals 
which the Combined Bomber Offensive hoped 
to attain were purposefully or accidentally 
leaked to the press, or whether a 
knowledgeable journalist just inferred the 
substance of its intent, the information was 
readily available to the public. 
The popular press available in Canada 
presented a plethora of information on the 
bombing of German cities in 1943-44. All 
important aspects, objectives, results and 
justifications of the air war were distributed 
to the Canadian readership. The press 
presented specific details on damage carried 
out against German cities, and did not spare 
the public from knowledge of the death and 
destruction being wrought against the German 
civilian population. Except for some technical 
advances, which the newspapers did not seem 
to have learned about, and the exact wording 
of government directives, the press coverage 
was comprehensive. Neither did the popular 
press feel compelled to criticize the bomber 
offensive or the targeting of German cities in 
any way. It was shown as part of the ongoing 
effort to bring down Nazi Germany. Assertions 
of secrecy or surreptitious behaviour on the 
part of Bomber Command are conspicuously 
absurd in the face of the overwhelming 
evidence to the contrary. 
The Globe & Mail, August 28, 1943. 
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